NCITE on Global Jihadism: 25th Anniversary of 9/11 Terrorist Attacks

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is a transnational Salafi-jihadist terrorist group, designated as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) by the U.S. Department of State. Since 2014 when the leader of ISIS declared the global caliphate, 272 individuals have been federally charged with ISIS-related crimes in U.S. courts. Since ISIS is a designated FTO, most cases (73.16%) involving ISIS-related activity are resolved using the material support to terrorism statute. This brief summarizes the scope of federal court cases related to ISIS in the U.S. from 2014 through 2026.

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is a transnational Salafi-jihadist terrorist group, designated as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) by the U.S. Department of State. In 2019, ISIS was driven out of Syria as conventional force, marking an official end of nearly five years of its self-described territorial caliphate. Despite the group’s territorial losses, homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) acting in support of ISIS within the United States have continued to pose a significant threat. These individuals generally face two options, each presenting distinct challenges for prevention and response: some HVEs attempt to travel to the Islamic State and its affiliate branches as foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs), while others choose to stay and plan attacks in the U.S. homeland.

Hundreds of leaders and followers of violent extremist organisations have been prosecuted and sentenced in U.S. federal courts. But case outcomes vary widely. In this study, we argue that leaders may receive more severe sentences than followers through three unique, non-compacting mechanisms: proportional accountability, headhunting, and/or deterrence. Evidence comes from a mixed-method study, based on original data collected from court documents associated with over 200 Islamic State-affiliated defendants in U.S. federal courts from 2014 to 2024. We find a discernible ‘leader effect’, which is substantiated by a content analysis of these documents. The results carry implications for theory and practice.

Approximately 300 Americans are estimated to have traveled or attempted to join the Islamic State (ISIS) as part of the group’s campaign in Syria and Iraq between 2013 and 2019. These individuals joined more than 53,000 men, women, and minors from roughly 80 countries. Often referred to as foreign (terrorist) fighters (FTF), these are individuals from third countries who travel to join a terrorist group to support its activities.

This report outlines a comprehensive framework of best practices in the reintegration of foreign terrorist fighter spouses and children (i.e., “the FTF family”). It collates and synthesizes a suite of interlocking principles to guide reintegration policy and implementation, covering practical challenges and programmatic objectives, the organizational structure and process of reintegration management in the U.S. context, the role of strategic communications and trauma-informed care, and the use of specialized risk assessment tools.

In late January 2023, the U.S. military conducted an operation in a cave complex located in northern Somalia that resulted in the death of Bilal al-Sudani, a key operative and facilitator for the Islamic State. The raid provides further evidence that Africa has become the “epicenter” for Islamic State activity in particular and for the global Sunni jihadist movement more broadly. Certainly, counterterrorism has been downgraded as a U.S. national security priority. Yet, the use of American military personnel in a risky ground-based operation reflects al-Sudani’s importance as well as the United States’ continued desire to acquire intelligence about the Islamic State’s networks.

Following a U.S. airstrike in Somalia in late May 2024, there were news reports that the Islamic State had appointed Abdulqadir Mumin, the emir of the group’s affiliate in Somalia, as its worldwide leader. The authors argue that the Islamic State’s reported regional shift in leadership would mark an unprecedented but pragmatic move for the organization. This article presents an overview of Mumin’s
background, assesses the Islamic State’s operations during Mumin’s supposed tenure, and situates the analysis within the context of the organization’s traditional approach to leadership.

The jihadist global-local nexus offers needed insight into the nature and scope of the
threat presented by the group today and in the near future. The group will communicate and
coordinate with the Islamic State’s leadership, but its centers of gravity are deeply local. The
majority of the group’s engagement with the ISIS transnational network will occur through
other affiliates on the African continent.

Terrorist leaders play a central role in overseeing and executing strategic and operational decisions to advance their group’s political goals. One key decision includes what targets should be attacked and how often. This study examines how a leader’s tenure and role in founding a group affect the nature and balance of targets attacked in group operations.

Terrorist use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) remains a persistent and evolving threat within the United States. Until now, few data collection and analysis efforts have focused on the systematic capture of terrorist bombing plots and attacks. Filling this evidence gap, this research note presents and analyses an original dataset of US federal charges associated with terrorism-related IED incidents in the United States observed from 2009 through 2024.

While unmanned aerial systems can serve as a force multiplier for militants, these systems do not embody a transformation in modern insurgent warfare or enable militants to engage regularly in strategic coercion. Instead, drone use is consistent with a militant group’s relative capabilities and broader strategic objectives. Consequently, these groups are likely to employ drones primarily for theater and tactical military purposes.

Violent extremists continue to innovate, drawing on emerging technologies and creative problem solving. The onus of initiative requires that the counterterrorism mission community looks over the horizon to identify emerging threats. In support of this need, the authors offer a forward-leaning taxonomy of emerging threats related to terrorist use of IEDs in the United States and outline its key implications for policy, practice, and applied study.

The lethality and the frequency of terrorist attacks conducted by militant organizations vary considerably. Some militants perpetrate extreme and systemic levels of terrorist violence, some only do so occasionally, and others never conduct terror operations. The findings also carry notable policy implications for policy makers, warfighters, and counterterrorism practitioners.