Michael Carrick

Dissertation

My dissertation provides a theoretical foundation for a philosophy of animal welfare. I argue that a theory of welfare should appropriately fit the welfare subject being considered. However, because the class of nonhuman animals is so large and varied, and different animals have different sets of capacities to different degrees, I argue that none of the major theories of welfare are a good fit for all welfare subjects. This leads me to present a variabilist conception of animal welfare: we should apply different theories of welfare to different welfare subjects, by applying the theory of welfare that best fits the teleological profile of the welfare subject under consideration. I put forth the capacity-first account of welfare, that says when determining what theory of welfare to apply to a welfare subject, we must first look at the cognitive and emotional capacities of the welfare subject. For those creatures with less cognitively and emotionally complex capacities, we should put more weight on hedonistic elements when measuring their welfare, and for those creatures with greater cognitive and emotional complexities, we should put greater emphasis on the satisfaction of preferences. I conclude the dissertation by showing how my capacity-first account of animal welfare makes a difference for two debates within animal ethics: holding animals in captivity and replaceability arguments in support of humane omnivorism.