The Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion

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mass killing in times of peace…[T]he fact of the matter is that nations recognize a moral obligation to refrain from the infliction of death and suffering under certain conditions despite the possibility of justifying such conduct in the light of a higher purpose, such as the national interest (Morgenthau 1948: 82).

Morgenthau holds to this same view almost twenty years later when he writes in *Politics among Nations* that ‘superior power gives no right, moral or legal, to do with that power all that it is physically capable of doing’ (Morgenthau 1967: 220). ‘Moral rules’, Morgenthau goes on to argue,

— do not permit certain policies to be considered at all from the point of view of expediency. Such ethical inhibitions operate in our time on different levels and with different effectiveness. Their restraining function is most obvious…in affirming the sacredness of human life in times of peace (Morgenthau 1967: 225).

Although national interest remains a cornerstone of Morgenthau’s realism, his intent is clear: to give realism a human face; to halt the slide of politics into a wanton disregard for humanity by ridding realism of the illusion of the absoluteness of the national interest. In short, Morgenthau struggled to address the lived realities of the political life, the possibilities and limitations of ethical action by statespersons and diplomats. Perhaps the worst that we could do to one another—mass extermination or genocide—confirmed to Morgenthau the need for the possibility of an unconstrained moral principle. Understood in this way, realism has therefore evolved into a morally thickened variety. In this sense, prudence and national interest become increasingly constrained in matters of extreme moral urgency. This might suggest that there is no other way in which realism can be thickened in a morally relevant sense. However, such a view would be misleading.

It is as common and perhaps also just as reasonable to think that there is nothing inherent within realism that precludes moral principles from being included in a country’s national interest. Indeed, beyond construing the thickening of realism solely through moral principles either overriding prudence or limiting national interest, a more transformative view of realism, one that includes elements of morality—norms, principles, and obligations—as part of a country’s national interest, develops and finds coherence in the context of an inflationary model of moral psychology and the experience of moral temptation. Actually, both the model and the experience give coherence to the other views of a thickened realism, although the transformative view is the most interesting of the three because it redefines national interest in terms that make it much more difficult for human rights, for example, to be neglected and unprotected, since they are identified as a national interest and, thus, are prioritized within a realist foreign policy.

Some may construe this transformative view of realism strictly in terms of consequentialism, in which case engaging in humanitarian interventions in order to protect people’s human rights, for example, becomes a part of a country’s national interest because it places the country in some sort of an advantageous position among other countries. It is plausible to suppose that, as a result of such intervention, the country’s world stature is enhanced; it finds a foothold in another country or region that has strategic value; or it provides relief that addresses some of the causes of terrorism. In emphasizing consequentialism, the account given here identifies the enhancement, foothold, and combat of terrorism as what induces the thickening. In other words, what leads policy-makers to include humanitarian intervention as a national interest is that certain consequences are likely to accrue from it, and these are none other than the inducers of moral thickening—enhancement, foothold, and combat of terrorism. It is all about the goodness that is expected to be generated by the intervention.

However, these may not be what induce the thickening, though these three factors may strengthen the determination with which certain policies are pursued. Instead, that which thickens realism may simply be related to the fact that people are moral beings who sometimes perceive a situation in a moral sense as one of extreme moral horror, in which case they can make a moral judgement that reflects the overriding normative status of certain moral principles, such as anti-genocide norms. It is at the judgement phase of moral performance that the perception of extreme moral horror triggers moral intuitions that are deontological in nature, and that associate the anti-genocide norms with, for example, human dignity and respect (Kant) or the non-reducible duty of non-maleficence (Ross), thereby giving these principles an overriding status and promoting humanitarian intervention as a national interest. Although this perception of extreme moral horror is not as commonplace among people as one might hope for, it is crucial to how elements of morality find their way into a country’s national interest in ways that have little to do with consequentialism. Thus, an appeal to an inflationary model of moral psychology is useful in explaining how this is so.
What, then, are the relevant aspects of an inflationary model (or holistic account) for demonstrating that realism can be moralised in a non-consequentialist way? These essential aspects are crystallised by Arne Johan Vetlesen in his *Perception, Empathy, and Judgement* (1994). According to Vetlesen, moral performance is a view of moral agency (or a person’s capacity for making moral judgements and engaging in conduct that agrees with morality). Such agency is often depicted as starting with a moral predicament followed by judgement and action. It is commonly thought that two well-informed, rational individuals who subscribe to the same moral theory, and who stumble into the moral predicament, would likely make somewhat similar judgements though they may or may not act on their judgements. Although this may be an overly optimistic account of like-minded actors, it does seem reasonable to suppose that actors who subscribe to radically different moral theories are more likely to disagree in their judgements, though it is difficult to imagine an act or rule utilitarian and a Kantian deontologist disagreeing on the moral impermissibility of genocide, for example.

Perhaps the most important question for how an inflationary model relates to realism may have to do with whether there is agreement among our judgements and more to do with how we ‘attend’ to the objects of moral judgement in the first place. How do we come into contact with the objects of moral judgements? Vetlesen acknowledges the importance that has been traditionally given moral judgement, yet he assigns moral perception with the task of providing and shaping the setting for both moral judgement and moral action. Thus, for Vetlesen, judgement is concerned with deliberations on how best to act given certain moral norms and precepts, with judgement exercised only when moral perception allows the person to ‘see’, the situation at hand as a morally relevant one, (4-5).

What exactly enables us to ‘see’ the situation as a morally relevant one? What must be satisfied for a person to be able to see whether and to what extent the well-being of others is at risk in a given situation? In a very unKantian move, Vetlesen turns to emotions; for it is through emotion, more specifically, the emotional faculty of empathy, that we experience the objects of moral judgements (4). He goes on to explain:

> It is by virtue of this faculty that I can put myself in the place of the other by way of a feeling-into and feeling-with. Empathy allows me to develop an appreciation of how the other experiences his or her situation; empathy facilitates the first reaching out toward and gaining access to the other’s experience, but empathy does not... mean that I myself come to feel what the other feels. I do not have to feel the other’s feeling in order to grasp, and thereby be able to judge in light of, how the other experiences the situation he or she is in (8).

 However, feelings of sympathy and compassion towards another do not arise out of themselves, as it were. Rather, these feelings are directed towards others by virtue of their suffering. So, without the subject of the emotion regarding the object as being in a certain state, e.g., of suffering or pain, the phenomenon of suffering would not be constituted as an object for moral judgement.

Given that moral perception is what ‘initiates’ moral performance, a person’s inattentiveness or indifference—lack of empathy—to the moral circumstances of a situation, will have devastating results for passing judgements. Perhaps this is less of a problem for those who reside together in situations of relative tranquility, for there will be frequent personal interactions that are ‘felt’ to be positive. At some point, the basic emotional faculty of empathy is triggered. But how easy is it for that same faculty to be triggered in situations involving peoples of different ethnicity and religion who do not reside together and who have few associations with one another? It is likely that this case would be one of ‘benign’ inattentiveness or indifference, the Other having little, if any, moral significance, thus making it unlikely for there to be objects for moral judgement. Worse yet are those situations that are less than tranquil. For example, given the hatred and anger that often overwhelm the empathic response of those who are victimised by terrorist attacks or who espouse ethnic nationalism, victims and nationalists alike may become ‘combative’ and stricken with a ‘malevolent’ form of inattentiveness. It is not simply a ‘lack’ of empathy, but rather a set of contrary emotions that inhibit empathy. The case of combative negativity is much more severe than that of ‘benign’ inattentiveness, for it is likely that some harm will be intentionally done to the Other. The quantity and quality of ‘felt’ interactions will be different. The possibility of respect and concern toward the Other ceases at this point; increasing the weal is not an option, but increasing the woe is, and this situation is contrary to empathy. In such a hostile situation, moral perception must be jump-started by the rejuvenation of attentiveness or empathy, thereby allowing one to once again recognise the Other’s moral significance and well-being.

If I were to try to lay out the mechanism by which perception is jump-started, it would require nothing less than piecing together how
risking hospitality triggers attentiveness so that intercultural education, storytelling, walking through history, and moral imagination stir up empathic responses. Fortunately, my task is a more limited one, for I am interested in how moral perception helps to explain the moralising of realism in a non-consequentialist way. I believe we have found the answer, for moral principles and thus, moral judgements, acquire a new-found importance with regard to certain sorts of events in the world only if moral perception allows policy-makers to see those events as being morally relevant, which ultimately means that those same policy-makers can empathise with the various peoples in those situations. It is at this point that the importance of those moral principles becomes enhanced to the point where they may become part of the country’s national interest. It is not a matter of figuring out the utility of including the moral principles in the national interest, but rather a matter of the overriding normative status of certain moral principles because we are moral beings; and it is this status that has led these principles be incorporated as a prioritised part of the country’s national interest. This could account for why Morgenthau seemed to shift his position to recognise the overriding status of certain moral principle, viz., the principle prohibiting mass extermination.

One might object, saying that what has been laid out is not two competing versions of moralised political realism but a thin sort that is in competition with a doctrine that is not properly classified as political realism. As the argument goes, acting morally either coincides with national interest or it does not. If adhering to moral concerns is in the national interest, then a thinly moralised realism is sufficient to argue for following morality because behaving morally is then ultimately a matter of prudence. On the other hand, if moral concerns trump national interest, then it is not clear that the primary obligation of a government is always the pursuit of national interest. This leads moral behaviour to an abandonment of political realism.

These criticisms overlook the distinguishing characteristic of thinly and thickly moralised political realism. First, a thinly moralised realism of Morgenthau’s variety takes moral principles like justice and equality as principles regulated by prudence (in terms of consequences of actions and policies) in the name of national interest. It is a consequentialist moral theory that may not properly take into account human dignity and respect but may sacrifice them for the sake of national interest. If this is the case, then a thinly moralised realism makes morality a stepchild to prudence and national interest.

Second, thickly moralised realism does not amount to moral concerns trumping national interest in the sphere of governmental actions and policies but is a matter of certain moral principles becoming prioritised parts of a country’s national interest. Rather than overriding the national interest, the moral principles overrule other parts of the national interest. This could be what does away with the paradox that threatens Morgenthau’s politico-ethical framework. So the claim that thickly moralised political realism is actually an abandonment of realism is unwarranted.

Perhaps a better critique would focus on how a thinly moralised realism would remain thin once empathetic responses were made as precursors to moral judgements. Would the thinly moralised version simply transform into a thick version? Or would prudence and national interest be such that the making of moral judgements would be short-circuited?

Laying out the mechanism by which realism can be moralised in a non-consequentialist way does not lead realism to be necessarily for or against the war on terrorism. Indeed, a thickly moralised realism does not necessarily rule out going to war. It is possible for elements of morality to become national interests that frustrate the worst from happening, and thereby support tranquillitas ordinis (i.e., civil peace) (Elshtain 2003: 48–49). If terrorism undermines civil peace by disturbing the everyday order enjoyed by citizens as well as the state’s ability to conduct business as usual, and ultimately the country’s national interests (understood in terms of peace, security, and prosperity), then arguments against entry into a war on terrorism may be difficult to defend. Perhaps some moral theories are better equipped than others to make such a defense; even so, the fact that terrorism is antithetical to a country’s peace, security, and prosperity is a major hurdle to overcome for the sake of staying out of the war.

We must not forget that acts of terrorism may be so intermittent, of such a small scale, and have such limited success in instilling fear in the populace that terrorism may have a negligible impact on civil peace and a country’s national interest, thereby undermining an argument for war proposed by any variety of moralised realism.

V The Constraining Force of Thickly Moralised Realism and the Same War

Yet even if a thinly and thickly moralised realism justifies the weaker ally’s entry into the war, this does not mean that the ally is required
risking hospitality triggers attentiveness so that intercultural education, storytelling, walking through history, and moral imagination stir up empathic responses. Fortunately, my task is a more limited one, for I am interested in how moral perception helps to explain the moralising of realism in a non-consequentialist way. I believe we have found the answer, for moral principles and thus, moral judgements, acquire a new-found importance with regard to certain sorts of events in the world only if moral perception allows policy-makers to see those events as being morally relevant, which ultimately means that those same policy-makers can empathise with the various peoples in those situations. It is at this point that the importance of those moral principles becomes enhanced to the point where they may become part of the country’s national interest. It is not a matter of figuring out the utility of including the moral principles in the national interest, but rather a matter of the overriding normative status of certain moral principles because we are moral beings; and it is this status that has led these principles be incorporated as a prioritised part of the country’s national interest. This could account for why Morgenthau seemed to shift his position to recognise the overriding status of certain moral principle, viz., the principle prohibiting mass extermination.

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V The Constraining Force of Thickly Moralised Realism and the Same War

Yet even if a thinly and thickly moralised realism justifies the weaker ally’s entry into the war, this does not mean that the ally is required
to battle the terrorists in every way that the stronger partner demands. Although allied leaders may have political and moral reasons to engage in such a war, they may also have political and moral reasons to be highly selective in how they prosecute the war. Whereas the thin form may call for greater latitude in how to conduct the war, the thick form may constrain the means by which the war ought to be prosecuted.33

How could the different forms of moralised realism do this? To begin with, we must remember that the moralisations under discussion are of political realism, so national interest defined in terms of power and security is essential. However, these moralisations may lead to incongruous judgements. Part of what makes thinly moralised realism so viable is its compatibility with what Jean Bethke Elshtain calls the basic end of government—*tranquillitas ordinis* (Elshtain 2003: 48-49). ‘Without civic peace—’, she notes,

> a basic framework of settled law and simple, everyday order—human life descends to its most primitive level. By primitive I mean rudimentary, the bare minimum—we struggle just to stay alive (Elshtain 2003: 48).

Although much more is required for a functioning democratic political community, including the virtues of trust and compromise, we can at least say that civic peace is foundational and that the state has an important role in making sure that peace is achieved. Civic peace requires the state, Elshtain writes, ‘to create those minimal conditions that prevent the worst from happening—meaning, the worst that human beings can do to one another’ (Elshtain 2003: 49). In turn, without meeting those ‘minimal conditions’, political leaders would find it difficult to implement policies that would enhance their country’s peace, security, and prosperity. Whatever jeopardises the civic peace of a country also jeopardises its national interests, and this makes terrorism a prime menace; for terrorism attempts to create ‘the worst that human beings can do to one another’. Consequently, civic peace becomes part of the thin realist project by offering further support for why countries should go to war against terrorism.

But the fact that civic peace is a condition for a country’s acting on its national interests is reason enough to think that the need to maintain civic peace will lead to an even more robust realism by offering a further basis for greater latitude in the prosecution of a war on terrorism. The basic idea is that if *tranquillitas ordinis* supports a country’s national interests, including a war on terrorism, by providing a suitable ‘habitat’, and terrorism acts to undermine that ‘habitat’, then whatever a country could do to combat terrorism would itself serve to promote *tranquillitas ordinis* along with the country’s other national interests. In other words, prudence would call for even further regulation of moral principles for the enhancement of national interest. So, in the case of the Algerian Group, Bosnian leaders could have agreed to deliver the six detainees to U.S. officials on the grounds that by doing so they were ‘creating those minimal conditions that prevent the worst from happening’ (Elshtain 2003: 49). In this case it could have been an attack on the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo. In addition, it would have sent a clear message to Washington that Bosnia was still a loyal ally to the U.S., thus creating grounds for favouritism towards Bosnia in future allocations of foreign aid. Indeed, the valuing of loyalty could turn out to be at the heart of a political bias toward needy allies. So the thin form of realism could well support both entry into the war on terrorism and greater latitude for the war’s prosecution. On the other hand, the thin form could well support a judgement that does not make it prudent for Bosnia to comply with U.S. demands, given its own demographic makeup of 40% Bosniaks. Going along with U.S. demands may, in fact, result in the undermining of *tranquillitas ordinis* by making Bosnia a prime target for Islamic terrorist groups.

But there remains the question of how the thick form of realism deals with these same entry and prosecution issues. As I suggested earlier in this work, the basis of this thickening is our capacity of moral perception, an emphatic capacity that allows us to perceive situations of extreme moral horror, thereby allowing us to make moral judgements that elevate certain moral principles to the point of overriding prudence and expediency.34 Of course, such perceiving is crucial for an ‘outsider’, i.e., one who has not had the ‘lived experience’ of one whose people have been the victim of genocide or ethnic cleansing. But for this thickening to take place for outsiders, they must move beyond simply ‘visualising’ the feelings of those who have experienced the moral horror of genocide and ethnic cleansing, for simply visualising their feelings does not entail that they have pity for them. As Max Scheler wrote in his insightful *The Nature of Sympathy*:

> ‘Such ‘visualised’ feeling remains [sic] within the cognitive sphere, and is not a morally relevant act’ (1973: 9). Instead, what is needed is fellow-feeling, ‘of feeling the other’s feeling, not just knowing of it, nor judging that the other has it; but it is not the same as going through the experience itself’ (Scheler 1973: 9). It is at this point,
then, that political leaders who are outsiders can no longer remain indifferent to the Other’s plight, which results in the elevation of anti-genocide norms for possible inclusion in their country’s national interest. The moral horror of genocide and ethnic cleansing would influence a change in U.S. national interest. Unfortunately, the hatred and anger of many in the U.S. following 9/11 have provoked a combative inattentiveness, which has led to the war on terrorism. In this case, an instance of moral horror in the form of a horrific terrorist attack has provoked what Vetlesen calls ‘projective hatred’ (1994: 267). In other words, an aggressive response, a war, is the result of the dehumanisation of the Other, of depriving the Other of status as a fellow human being, leading to the Other’s ultimate destruction. At this point in time, there is no widespread desire for reconciliation within the U.S.; healing has not yet taken place. It is the most difficult case wherein moral perception must be ‘jumpstarted’.

But what factors within a thickened realism bring about such constraint when it comes to a country like Bosnia? They would have to include those special circumstances peculiar to their historical and moral contingency. In the case of Bosnia, the experience of living through the moral horror of genocide and ethnic cleansing would be one thickening agent. Unfortunately, many members of Bosnia’s constituent peoples to this day face the same difficulties towards one another as do many Americans with members of societies that have been associated with 9/11. Many have difficulty empathising with others, though in the case of Bosnia, ethnic nationalism is the principal obstacle. Unlike the case of the U.S. and 9/11, however, a formal peace agreement was reached in Bosnia through the Dayton Peace Accord, and for there to be a furthering of the process of building peaceful relations between the constituent peoples, there must be a transformation (reconciliation) in the former adversaries’ attitudes towards one another. The recognition of this need for reconciliation, in turn, would promote the need for emphatic responses towards one another, which would further stimulate the need for reconciliation.

Of course, some members of each of the constituent peoples do not believe that they must continue to live peacefully within the same country, i.e., there is a desire on the part of some to divide Bosnia into mono-ethnically dominated countries. But for those who do not have such a desire, it is recognised that reconciliation is needed to build lasting peace and ultimately prevent the perpetuation of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and systematic rape, as well as the clear violation of the principle of discrimination and non-combatant immunity. Leading to the desire to make the prevention of some moral horror a national interest that constrains a country’s conduct is the desire for reconciliation in order to build a stable and lasting peace in the country. Although 9/11 is an instance of moral horror, there is no widespread desire for reconciliation within the U.S. Instead, 9/11 is what has mobilised the resources of the United States to strike back at the terrorists. War, not reconciliation, is the name of the game. For a country like Bosnia, however, there is a realisation among many of its citizenry that peace, security, and prosperity will only come about through reconciliation among its peoples. Reconciliation is more than conflict resolution: it includes restoring relationships, which are made ever more difficult because of atrocities (Bar-Tal and Bennick 2004; Cilliers 2002). The violation of the principle of discrimination and non-combatant immunity, which accompanied the wartime atrocities in Bosnia, must cease even in peacetime if reconciliation is to succeed. Unfortunately, the Bosnian government failed to do what it could to guarantee that the principle would not be violated with the Algerian Group. There was some reason to believe there would be little public accountability of what would happen to the group, given the secrecy that surrounds detentions at Guantánamo Bay. This was a moment of ‘moral temptation’, for the politically expedient decision to transfer the detainees into U.S. custody was not the only choice; a thickened realism gave the Bosnian leadership a basis upon which to reject the U.S. request. The ‘remembrance of things past’ and the desire for reconciliation reflected in national interests and linked to tranquillitas ordinis, could have overridden any such request. In this case, however, the request was not overridden, perhaps because the emphatic response was not forthcoming and/or there was a weak recognition of the need for reconciliation, thereby allowing expediency to prioritise favourable consequences in terms of future foreign aid allocations.

VI Conclusion

Reconceptualisation often leads to new ways of thinking. Within the domain of politics, particularly within the dominant realist camp, there is no better way to bring about new ideas than to bring out the implications of what the political realists are thinking so they may stop thinking them. Perhaps one thing that must no longer be thought is the way in which political realism has been described in either/or
terms. While many consider realism as not being sufficiently moralised, i.e., amoral, others champion it as a defense against moralism. In this paper I have sought to challenge this description by showing that this is a false dilemma, obscuring both thinly and thickly moralised realisms that may prove useful in justifying a range of actions, albeit at times incongruous. Thinly moralised realism can lead to a variety of interventions and non-interventions on behalf of a country’s national interest. I do not mean to suggest that the Bosnian government’s decision to release the Algerian Group into U.S. custody was unquestionably wrong; however, such an action is suggestive of a deeper failing, one that could lead to thinly rather than thickly moralised judgements concerning the detainees. It is here that the inflationary model is useful. If I am right, this failing does: (1) not exhibit an adequate emphatic response towards some people; (2) not sufficiently recognise the need for reconciliation in order to build a stable and lasting peace in Bosnia; and/or (3) not recognise the need to set an example to the rest of the world that it is important to learn from one’s past and not to perpetuate the sort of disregard for the innocent that can occur when national interest is narrowly defined in terms of power and security.

Finally, it needs to be made clear that even with the force of prudence and expediency, political realism need not be rejected. On the contrary, when realism becomes ‘thickened’, not only can it be tolerated; it can be thought of as perfectly legitimate. This points to a fundamental ambiguity of modern politics, namely the ambiguous character of the relationship between political realism and the quest for authentic policymaking. Authenticity occurs when policy is the result of its makers acknowledging the fact that they are moral beings and taking into account their ‘national facticity,’ e.g., the case of Bosnia’s genocide and ethnic cleansing. If this quest is not simply a realisation of thin realism’s national interest defined in terms of power and security, neither is it a rejection of these goals. It follows that neither an approach of uncritical acceptance of thin realism nor one of uncompromising rejection of the need for power and security will suffice as a realist response to authenticity. On the contrary, an adequate realist response to this quest for authenticity must recognise and assimilate the thick realist vision. This form of realism can make moral principles a part of national interest. Thick realism acknowledges that policy-makers are moral beings who occasionally recognise the overriding normative status of moral principles in situations of extreme moral horror and who embark on policies that recognise the need for reconciliation and peace in their own country, as well as outside it. Thick realism takes a more serious posture towards these needs than does the thin variant, which may lead policy-makers of weaker countries to succumb to the dictates of more powerful allies. Again, the events surrounding the Algerian Group may well demonstrate this point.

Realist policy-makers, whether they operate in Sarajevo or Washington, need to begin the long, arduous task of reconceptualising not only the foundations of their national interests but also the process by which authentic foreign policy can be formulated and implemented. Although many realists seem to express little interest in such rethinking, perhaps the genocide, ethnic cleansing, and terrorism that continue to occur will cause a ripple in their moral being such that thick realism becomes dominant, promoting reconciliation and peace throughout the world. There must be a greater interest in lived human reality, in the weal and woe of others for all this to happen. If there continue to be failures on the level of moral perception, we will all epitomise the unresponsive bystander, watching tragedy upon tragedy unfold throughout the world.

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Notes

3. Or as Duncan Bell writes about the difficulty of laying out the political vision of Morgenthau, there are about as many Morgenthauas as there are those who interpret him (2009: 8).
4. C.A.J. Coady has gone further and has raised the issue that both realists and their critics have misunderstood realism itself such that they misinterpret the realist project as being hostile to morality in international affairs rather than hostile to moralism, ‘a kind of vice involved in certain ways of practising morality or exercising moral judgement, or thinking that you are doing so’ (Coady 2008: 15).
5. Chandler notes that ethical foreign policy is not restricted to the desires and priorities of a particular citizenry, but goes beyond the wishes of the electorate. In fact, he quotes Nigel Dower as noting that ‘once we recognize that our duty extends towards those unknown, i.e., that we have a duty of more extended caring, then the unknown can be anywhere and anyone, irrespective of place, race, creed, sex or whatever’ (Dower 1997: 103). For a brief, but excellent discussion of how realists view the problems associated with an ethical foreign policy, see Chandler and Heins (2007: 4-8).
6. For insight into moral psychology, see, for example, Jacobs (2002); Flanagan (1991); Thomas (1989); and Williams (1985).
8. For a discussion of this apparent discounting of lesser countries’ national interests as a reflection of ‘national egoism’, see Schlesinger, Jr (1971), who notes that it is in violation of a consistent defense of national interest, as well as being contrary to long-term national interest. I concur in Schlesinger’s claim about ‘egoism’, what Rosenthal refers to as a country’s tendency towards self-righteousness and messianism (1991: 6), but I find his claim having to do with a consistent defense to be questionable. In particular, there could be a problem because of the important of prudence for realists like Morgenthau. If prudence amounts to the survival of one’s own nation and not others, it seems only consistent to reject or not take into account the interests of another nation if it meant the survival of your own nation.
9. By ‘moral agents’ I mean those persons who can perform genuine intentional actions (and so are able to perceive relevant facts and reason about consequences) and who are thus morally responsible for what they do. The classic statement of the situation of moral temptation was by Campbell 1938.
10. The range of definitions of terrorism is vast as shown by Schmid, Jongman et al. (1988) in their documentation of 109 different definitions of ‘terrorism’. See also Dekmejian (2007); Duffy (2005); Elshtain (2003); Franks (2006); Graham (1997); Hoffman (1998); Kapitan (2003); Malik (2001); Nathanson (2007); Nielsen (1981); Norton (1995); Primoratz (1990); Rockmore et al. (2005); Schmid (2004); Sterba (2003, 2005); Stern (2004); Walzer (2004); and Wellman (1979).
11. For an insightful discussion of how the Bush administration has impaired or violated fundamental individual rights and liberties, see Dworkin (2005). See also Singer (2004: 63-89).
13. The Algerian Group is made up of Bensayah Belkacem, Mustafa Adir, Saber Lamar, Muhamed Nehle, Lakdar Bumedian, and Boudellah Hadz. It should be noted that orders for the release of most members of the Algerian Group have been issued and that some of them have subsequently returned to Bosnia.
14. Jack Donnelly refers to a continuum of realist positions, which reflect the “intensity and exclusivity” of the core principles of realism and non-realists elements or ‘hedges’ (2005: 29-30). For overviews of political realism as a theory of international relations, see Burchill and Linklater (2005); Chan and Moore (2006); Murray (1997); Rosenthal (1991); Smith (1986); Wayman and Dichei (1994); and Wofers (1962).
16. I am indebted to Seán Molloy’s use and discussion of ‘ubiquity of evil’ in Molloy (2009: 92-93).
17. This brings up the relevance of evolutionary theory to ethics. See Dawkins (1976) for a discussion of the biological nature of ‘selfishness’ and Mackie (1978) for his challenge of Dawkins.
18. In his ‘The Demands of Prudence’ (Morgenthau 1962a), Morgenthau associates choosing the least evil with ‘the commands of Christian ethics’ (16).
19. It is important to note that the idea that moral principles are absolute is not without its problems, including the possibility of conflict cases. Within a Kantian context, see Geach (1969).
20. Morgenthau responds insightfully to his critics when he writes: ‘People arrive at the conclusion that I am not concerned with the problem of morality. The truth is that I am too much concerned with it’ (Russell 1990: 149).
21. This distinction is alluded to by Nathanson (2006). Nathanson distinguishes ‘amoral realism’ from ‘moralised realism’; the former rejects the application of morality to international affairs, while the latter claims that political leaders have a moral duty to promote the national interest even though there are no such things as universal moral judgements (2006: 3).
22. Kant (1976) and Ross (1930).
23. However, Lebow insists that Morgenthau dismissed consequentialist ethics on the grounds that ‘we can never know the longer-term consequences of our actions’ (2003:237). This is the sort of argument that Kant used to buttress his argument for an absolute rule against lying. Unfortunately, Kant and Morgenthau
both adopted an unreasonably pessimistic view of what we know about the world, including our actions. Indeed, there are occasions in which we are quite confident about the consequences of our actions, though we would never say that we are ‘certain’ about those outcomes.

24. For a challenge to the view that morality is an other-regarding affair, see Louden (1992).


27. Molloy (2009: 95) recognises the regulatory function of prudence and the importance of national interest when he notes that in a situation in which there is a conflict between the national interest and an abstract principle such as liberty, the prudent moral choice would be to select the survival of the nation.

28. The issue of coherency and transience of a web of national interests is noted but will not be taken up here.

29. Such talk may even lead us to cosmopolitanism. See Appiah (2006).

30. For an excellent argument for the obligation to keep informed about distant atrocities, see Filice (1990).


32. Granted, the harm created by indifference is potentially greater than that caused by hatred, primarily because of its indiscriminateness (Vetlesen 1994: 252-53); but hatred has a certain directness to its harm that indifference does not possess.

33. This is similar to the *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* criteria of just war theory. See Orend (2006). For further work in this area, see Coppieters and Fotion (2002); Norman (1995); and Orend (2000). For a discussion of just war theory and terrorism, see some of the contributions in Lee (2007).

34. Again, the developments on the Armenian genocide issue before the U.S. Congress should not lead us to focus on how the logic of realism determines the limits to enlarging moralism, but rather on how the political leadership of the U.S. is incapable of moral perception such that the country’s logistical dependence on Turkey for its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan overrides support for House Resolution 106.

35. But where was that ‘fellow-feeling’, elevation of anti-genocide norms, and, ultimately, intervention, during the massacres in Burundi (1972), Cambodia (mid-1970s), Iraq (1988), and Rwanda (1994), which all met the legal definition of genocide.

36. The situation in Israel and the Occupied Territories between Jew and Palestinian is another situation wherein there is no widespread recognition for reconciliation. Moral horror exists but there remains a war mentality. How could it be otherwise if ‘the Arab [is still] conceived as a shadow that dogs the Jew’ (Said 1920: 5).

References


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