UNIFIED PLURALISM: FOSTERING RECONCILIATION AND THE DEMISE OF ETHNIC NATIONALISM

Could a greater miracle take place than for us to look through each other’s eyes for an instant? We should live in all the ages of the world in an hour; ay, in all the worlds of the ages. History, Poetry, Mythology! – I know of no reading of another’s experience so startling and informing as this would be.

– Henry David Thoreau, Walden

Since the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) was initialed on 21 November 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a “grand experiment” in democratisation, a comprehensive set of peace-building activities ranging from top-down international regulation of elections, economic management, and institutional development to bottom-up development of political culture through civil society-building. Moreover, this broad international involvement in Bosnian affairs was non-negotiable. Beginning in late 1997, the international mandates were extended. For example, the High Representative was granted the power to take action against obstructionist elected officials at both state and entity levels. With the extension of international regulatory mechanisms over the past few years, the Bosnian political leadership has had a limited role in developing and implementing policy. Bosnia and Herzegovina is a sovereign state, but policy is, in large measure, determined by international policy-making bodies like the Office of the UN High Representative (OHR), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This has led to a “culture of dependency,” little economic prosperity, and a superficial democracy.

Yet this dependency has been needed, for it has offered a framework for rejuvenating civil society in a multi-ethnic state, especially in the face of the anti-modern and anti-democratic forces of ethnic nationalism. Such a populist ideology, whether it be Croatian,
Serbian, or Bosniac, is obstructionist to a genuine democracy or, in a broader sense, to an open society.\(^5\) Granted, the economy is in shambles and land mines clutter the countryside, but the xenophobia and ethnic chauvinism that are generated by ethnic nationalism are an insidious problem that threatens the country's stability by transforming those who are of the "wrong" identity into second-class citizens, contrary to the notion of rights and liberties understood within a democratic framework.\(^6\)

In writing about the nature of the text in the Balkans, the Croatian author Dubravka Ugrešić notes that it is the origin of the writer that has been given importance. She writes that "national origin is the essential fact: it is the measure of all things, it determines perspective, it is the most fundamental assumption in the relation between Sender and Recipient."\(^7\) Nationalism reflects this same highlighted reality, for nationalism commands that an exclusivist society is superior to an inclusivist one, separating people and placing them into ethnic categories, thereby weakening the solidarity of the larger community.\(^8\) A vast amount of passionate support is often generated for nationalist leaders, given that the peoples' dignity is reinforced – they can once again be proud of who they are by being defined as essentially members of a "real," ethnic, or national community.\(^9\) As Bogdan Denitch puts it in his treatment of ethnic nationalism in Yugoslavia, ethnic chauvinism expands the responsibility of individual citizens such that they now "share in collective responsibility for actions of the leaders of that community."\(^10\) It is the old "we" versus "they" mentality, but with nationalism there is the added feature of power and force becoming tools used by mono-ethnic political parties, like the SDS, SDA, and HDZ in Bosnia.\(^11\) In Bosnia's case, the problem seems to be compounded because of its "two entity" composition, an arrangement that has, if anything, helped to sustain the power of at least some of the ethnic parties.\(^12\)

Some Bosnians believe that an improved economy is the key, and that once people have a job and a livable wage, they will soon forget who is who. Consequently, the solution is thought to be in the economic development of the country.\(^13\) Although accepting the multiplicity of a person's identity, proponents of this view define each of their countrymen in singular terms, i.e., as *Homo*
economicus. That is what overrides (or makes tolerable) all other identities, at least in their important interactions with one another. The one-dimensionality of such a reductionist conception of identity, however, is unrealistic insofar as it grants too much value to the economic, and too little, if any, value to other modes of human existence, such as the political and religious. Yet it is appealing insofar as it generates a certain amount of optimism about future human interaction: it is just a matter of time before the economy and your situation improve! Nevertheless, people mired in a deeply-rooted conflict pitting neighbor against neighbor may need to look beyond personal benefit from political and economic institution-building by international bodies and find ways to change their conflictual relationships among themselves if they are to build a community that has the capacity to resolve differences peacefully. The international community of specialists too often focuses on institutions — states, governments, and formal institutions — and on the instruments of diplomacy — formal mediation, negotiation, elections, and regulatory mechanisms — in arriving at a lasting peace. However, the importance of the human dimension of conflict must be addressed if there is to be a strengthening of civil society such that tensions are reduced and there begins to develop a cohesion in the community at large. As Harold H. Saunders makes clear from his years of experience in resolving conflicts, “[t]o]nly governments can write peace treaties, but only human beings — citizens outside government — can transform conflictual relationships between people into peaceful relationships.” As a means to that end, it is the task of the scholar to help grind the lenses that will be used to bring a different world into focus by future generations. One way of accomplishing this is to explore how the concepts of human difference and identity are relevant to the process of reconciliation, a process that is needed for civil society-building to be successful.

To be sure, the claim that there are many important ways in which human beings are not alike is beyond question. They differ in terms of physical, mental, and emotional characteristics or dispositions: vast differences in terms of ascribed attributes first possessed at birth and propositional attributes acquired over a period of time. Examples of these attributes are race and ethnicity, and religion and ideology. People differ in terms of their human experiences, some
of which are quite traumatic. Saunders believes that differences, ascribed or propositional, are extremely important in creating our identity, in shaping our views of ourselves and of the world that we live in because “[f]rom the start of life, an important part of identity is formed in relationship by setting one’s self off against others and making clear who one is not.” It is a matter of individuation and a perpetuation of the enormous diversity of humanity. In a sense, then, it could be said that there are as many worlds as there are people, though there are many common threads running between many of these worlds.

In contrast to how some differences are created and recognized among human beings, ethnic nationalism, as a propositional attribute, does a superb job in deploying cultural markers to differentiate the primary group from others, and usually to indicate a sense of superiority over them. Differences, at least certain differences, are made more pronounced, leading to marginalization, ostracism, and the worst kind of multicultural absolutism. Its power lies in how it is reified by its proponents such that it tears apart the conceptual fabric of a free, just, and cohesive society. In fact, the very antithesis of an open society, an association of free individuals respecting one another’s rights within a framework of law, seems closer to becoming a reality when ethnic nationalism is at work. The thought of doing unto the others as we would have them do to us is cast as a thing of the past, if not transformed into a fiction. Ethnic nationalism de-legitimizes thinking of the Other (i.e., members of another ethnic group) as people like ourselves, deserving full respect which we ourselves lay claim to. Instead of the creation of a reciprocal relationship or a win-win identity situation, there is now a zero-sum identity game. We are all losers when ethnic nationalism is a determining difference. In short, it helps to sustain conflictual relationships.

Three points must be made clear. First, many of these differences are features of our existential condition beyond our control, what the French existentialist Jean Paul-Sartre refers to as our “facticity.” For example, I had nothing to do with willing myself to be a male who was born in the United States, nor did my friend Wong Hongwei will herself to be a female who was born in China. People are born with a particular ethnicity, which is to say that ethnicity
is ascribed and not acquired, though one can “loose” his or her ethnicity by forgetting or renouncing the associated language and customs.\textsuperscript{23} Second, differences (as well as commonalities) that exist between people become meaningful because we make them meaningful. Differences become important in the eye of the beholder. Simply because a Bosnian lays claim to being a Bosniac, Croat, or Serb does not necessitate that that act be understood as provocative by an onlooker, but the onlooker makes it so by bestowing upon it a particular meaning.\textsuperscript{24} Likewise, a government might require its citizens to proclaim their ethnic identity in order for them to gain advantage of certain official or unofficial goods or services, thereby making their ethnic identity a misplaced source of anxiety and dread. It is because of the disruptiveness of ethnic nationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina that there is an urgent need felt by many to form a national identity: Bosnian, not Bosniac. Bosnian, not Serbian. Bosnian, not Croat.\textsuperscript{25} Third, participants in a dialogue must acknowledge that they bring with them the “rooting” of their own membership and identity. Although such a dialogue requires participants to shift away from their view or position in order to put themselves in a situation of exchange with Others who have different group membership and identity, this shift does not necessitate a total abandonment of their source of belonging.\textsuperscript{26} Thus, it might be best to identify the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina as Bosniac Bosnians, Serb Bosnians, and Croat Bosnians, thereby iterating the point that ethnic labels are not naturally or inherently derogatory, that they acquire their negativity only when made negative and that is not a foregone conclusion that we do so. We choose to make it so.

For differences to attain a less threatening status (for the onlooker to become “immunized”), however, differences must be “peeled away” to the point that we see ourselves in Others around us: we must recognize that which we share in common with the Other, that is, the Others’ humanness. Instead of allowing shared commonalities to be overshadowed by differences (e.g., ethnicity and religion), which tend to be the basis of trust and cooperation within an exclusivist community, we need to dwell on the universal, that which unites us in the greater community of humanity. It is a collective identity insofar as we are referring to membership in a group, but
it transcends that designation insofar as we share something in common with all members of that group, and so it is best to refer to it as a universal identity. The particular is displaced by the universal, a universalism that we all desire and one which creates self-dignity in our different identities. Moreover, as Jean Bethke Elshtain points out in her work on Bosnia, "[a] universalism that sustains respect for difference is a universalism aware of human need for concrete reference groups in order to attain and to sustain individuality and identity."27 We must become none other than "civic pluralists," embracing "universalist aspirations and possibilities" through gestures of heartfelt solidarity, friendship, and citizenship.28 In a sense, universalism is a reaffirmation of our spirituality insofar as we experience a lived-sense of Unity in a World of Plurality.

What are the commonalities, the identity, that each one of us shares with other human beings, our common human nature? Human beings have the capacity to reason about how they act; they are beings that possess what has been traditionally referred to as free will, by which I mean that human beings have in some sense the capacity of choosing how they shall act in the world. Insofar as human beings realize their capacities of reason and free will, they are under an obligation to take responsibility for their actions, which involves trying to figure out what they ought to do.29 However, some philosophers, like the American neo-pragmatist, Richard Rorty, find the very notion of a human nature or human essence to be suspect because they argue that there is no such thing as an intrinsic property or a nonrelational feature of something.30 Rather than talk of natures or essences, Rorty refers to humanity as an "open-ended project" and selfhood as "in process of making."31 In a sense, then, "human beings are what they make themselves," and they describe themselves one way rather than another through a particular lense or project.32 If human beings are disposed towards greater happiness and a lessening of pain, and our "most distinctive and praiseworthy capacity is our ability to trust and cooperate with other people, and in part to work together and to improve the future," then it is understandable why the human project is portrayed as harmony.33 It is a matter of "fraternity." If we take seriously the claim that human beings are under an obligation to take responsibility for their actions,
then we as human beings ought to determine what will lead us to our maximizing fraternity.

This is a “spiritual quest” insofar as it uncovers the qualities of the human spirit—patience, tolerance, love, compassion, forgiveness, contentment, a sense of responsibility, a sense of harmony—which bring happiness. What unifies these qualities is some level of concern or care for Others’ well-being. Many who come from very different traditions have recognized the importance of this “other-directedness.” For instance, it is a mark of the spiritual for Václav Havel. In a speech about the spiritual dimension of politics, delivered at Wroclaw University in 1992, Havel noted that this dimension involves “the will to come to an agreement and to cooperate, the ability to place the common and general interest over any personal or group interests, the feeling of common responsibility for the world, and the willingness personally to stand behind one’s own deeds.”

Likewise, The Dalai Lama, who comes from the Eastern tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, recognizes this focus when he writes of the cultivation of universal responsibility, a responsibility that involves a reorientation of our heart and mind away from self and toward others. To develop a sense of universal responsibility—of the universal dimension of our every act and of the equal right of all others to happiness and not to suffer—is to develop an attitude of mind whereby, when we see an opportunity to benefit others, we will take it in preference to merely looking after our own narrow interests.

Of course, as the American legal scholar Michael J. Perry points out, personal experience as well as the experience of historical communities has led some to the “bedrock” conviction that part of human well-being, “one’s authentic flourishing as a human being—is concern for the well-being of one’s sisters and brothers,” and that the Other can be construed as sister and brother. The American philosopher Martha C. Nussbaum offers similar sentiments when she writes that “the good of other human beings is an end worth pursuing in its own right, apart from its effect on [an individual’s] own pleasure or happiness.” The good of every human being is an end worth striving for in its own right because, Nussbaum writes, “it seems to be a mark of the human being to care for others and feel disturbance when bad things happen to them.” Why is this?
Some argue that human beings are sacred. Others dispense with the explanation and take as axiomatic that there are commonalities between human beings, one of which is that human beings are essentially caring beings.

Can it seriously be denied that human beings are alike in some ways such that there are some things that are good or that serve the well-being of every human being, and some things that are bad or that disserve the well-being for every human being? Well, confidence runs high that all human beings have some needs and wants in common. As the British philosopher Philippa Foot clearly notes:

All need affection, the cooperation of others, a place in a community, and help in trouble. It isn’t true to suppose that human beings can flourish without these things – being isolated, despised, or embattled, or without courage or hope.

These things are human and serve human well-being, whereas acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and rape are inhumane and diminish the human. Moreover, according to Perry, there also seem to be some things of value to every human being; whatever satisfies, or somehow conduces to the satisfaction of, a common, human need. There are, in that sense, goods common to every human being. Some goods are universal and not merely local in character. Some goods are human. They include various human capacities or capabilities or virtues, namely, those that enable human beings to struggle against those forces, inside them as well as outside, that periodically threaten the well-being of any human being and for those things, those states of affairs or those states of being, congenial to the flourishing of any human being.

As Perry notes, however, this in no way denies that “some things are good and some things are bad for some human beings but not for others.” So even if a mark of human beings seems to be a caring for some other human beings (which often include the members of one’s own nuclear and extended families, tribe, race, religion, nation, and ethnicity), it is not a mark of human beings per se that they care for all other human beings.

Even if talk of a human nature or essence is reasonable, British philosopher Stuart Hampshire has made the well-deserved point that human nature, conceived in terms of common human needs and capacities, always underdetermines a way of life, and underdetermines an order of priority among virtues, and therefore underdetermines the moral prohibitions and injunctions that support a way of life.
Cloaking this core of humanity is the mask of pluralism. Differences between persons and groups are quite abundant. Pluralism in and of itself is not the problem. In fact, as Rorty so insightfully points out, having Mill and Dewey in mind, pluralism is valuable for it is “the maximization of opportunities for individual variation, and group variation insofar as the latter facilitates the ability of individuals to recreate themselves.”

The thrust of the diversity movement in Europe and elsewhere appears to have captured this idea of self-creation, individual variation, and tolerance. This is a worthy agenda, but we must not lose sight of the fact that moral allegiance typically goes to a set of customs and institutions of an intergroup or nested set of intergroups and not to humanity. This underscores the troublesome nature of ethnic nationalism, for ethnic nationalism of whatever banner serves up the “Holy Blood Group” and its concrete way of life as the differences and the cause that are worth fighting the Other to the death. So whether we are disposed to pluralism, or to universalism, it is clear that both are a part of the human condition.

Yet it is on the basis of universalism rather than pluralism (what I call a “unified pluralism”) that we must construct the edifice that stretches to the “harmonization of humanity.” As Rorty notes, “moral development in the individual, and moral progress in the human species as a whole, is a matter of re-marking human selves so as to enlarge the variety of the relationships which constitute those selves.”

Think of our moral relationship as being a series of concentric spheres of attachment and obligation. The innermost sphere is our nuclear family, followed by spheres for extended family, friends, neighbors, business associates, and moves further out to the point that there is a sphere for humanity. Perhaps some people have more spheres that others, but ideally it is the last sphere, the sphere for humanity, that we must reach during our lives.

Restricting the moral community to members of one’s own ethnic group is not a sign of irrationality or unintelligibility, but it is a sign of moral undesirability. We should strive for moral progress, which, according to Rorty, is a matter of increasing sensitivity, increasing responsiveness to the needs of a larger and larger variety of people and things...
Of course, there is no *irrefutable* argument or argument that will convince anyone, regardless of background, of the merits of the harmonization of humanity or extreme inclusivity. It simply does not exist. Rorty is right and Plato is wrong; there will be beliefs, even beliefs that seem so true and obvious, that will not be taken as worthy of adoption. No matter how hard we sometimes try, there will still be Serbs, Croats, and Bosniacs who do not see eye-to-eye and who will perpetuate hatred based on differences. Yet perhaps Rorty points us down the only path that is available to us: “It can only be made evident to people whom it is not too late to acculturate into our own particular, late-blooming, historically contingent form of life.”\(^{52}\) For some this may suggest a certain degree of pessimism, but it may be a very realistic prognosis of things to come. More importantly, it rests on a hope that it is not too late.

Unfortunately, Rorty ultimately rejects commonality as the basis for our moral betterment and selects difference, more specifically, the transformation of the importance of differences that divide us. If we can only make the differences seem trivial — the differences between Serb, Croat, and Bosniac — then moral progress is at our fingertips.\(^{53}\) The differences that figure into crisis situations as found in the Balkans, however, are much more than cosmetic. People can no more easily ignore these differences than can a black man in a white community in the United States dismiss his race and his African-American tradition on a whim. Because persons attach great importance to their self-concept and the urgent need for self-esteem, social identity is a powerful force.\(^{54}\)

In the face of a multitude of differences and the fragility of reconciliation that we must live with, how do we proceed to an “increasing sensitivity, increasing responsiveness to the need of a larger . . . variety of people”\(^{55}\) or to an expansion of our spheres of attachment and obligation such that we move closer and closer to a “harmonization of humanity” under the guise of a unified pluralism? How do we support the reconciliation process in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Thoreau would have us believe that seeing the world through someone else’s eyes, eyes different from our own, would allow us to better understand and accept that which makes us different. However, I read him as suggesting another way. In the process of reaching the sphere for humanity, we achieve under-
standing and tolerance of others by recognizing the commonalities between human beings, and we gain that by “seeing the world” through other peoples’ eyes in what Nussbaum calls “intercultural education.”

Education in general, and intercultural education in particular, has the potential to liberate us from received opinion, the sort of opinion that often divides us along certain ethnic, racial, and religious categories. In the best case scenario, it allows us to distance ourselves from that opinion, from our interests, so that we can at least recognize that the perspective of the Other is as deserving of respect as our own, though always subject to standards such that the content of every perspective may cast doubt on the adequacy of the perspective. As Nussbaum writes,

If one comes to see one’s adversaries as not impossibly alien and other, but as sharing certain general human goals and purposes . . . this understanding will lead toward a diminution of anger and the beginning of rational exchange.

Studying other cultures allows us to “see ourselves in the Other,” thereby allowing us to empathize with them and to act in a civicly responsible way toward them. We can, in a sense, imagine what it would be like to be in the other person’s situation, to see and feel how the world is through the eyes of the Other. Increasing our contact with narratives from different ethnic, racial, and religious groups promotes this sort of response. Coming into contact with the written and spoken word, or the tragic image, of the Other, whether the Other is Bosniac, Serb, and Croat, moves us closer to the “harmonization of humanity.”

Saunders notes, however, that achieving such a position does not simply result from an exchange of views, but is a “process of genuine interaction through which human beings listen to each other deeply enough to be changed by what they learn,” a process called “dialogue.” Conflictual relationships change because we think, feel, and behave differently when we have replaced the “us and them” or “I or you” relationship with a “we” relationship or a “you and me” relationship. There is a definite change in how we live our lives, particularly how we interact with other persons. Not only is there an incorporation of others’ views, which enlarges our perspective, but there is a recognition that the Other is not all that different in some ways and that a common ground exists between
us. It is at this point that, in the case of Bosnia, we can speak of "interethnic trust."

It would be wonderful if there were a simple guide for the construction of a suitable political culture and civil society in Bosnia. Unfortunately, past experience has shown that there is no such guide, especially when strong ethnic nationalisms stand in the way of reconciliation. Granted, institution building is needed to provide the conditions suitable for the virtues of individual and collective autonomy and critical thinking, an acceptable moral framework, and the expressions of solidarity, friendship, and citizenship within multiethnic Bosnia. At the same time, however, there must be efforts to educate people so that autonomy and unified pluralism become achievable goals. Pluralism and diversity only become tolerable, acceptable, and something that can be assimilated when they are wrapped in recognizable unity.

NOTES


2 See Peace Implementation Council, Bonn Peace Implementation Conference 1997: ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998: Self-Sustaining Structures,’ Bonn, 10 December 1997, XI, par. 2. Wolfgang Petritsch, the current High Representative who was appointed in August 1999, has used the right to remove from office appointed and elected officials who are not compliant with the DPA. As of 9 May 2001, Petritsch removed 59 functionaries. Perhaps the most controversial case was the removal of Ante Jelavić from the position of BiH Presidency member and President of HDZ BiH. See Sead Numanovic and Dnevnik Avaz, "Thus Far Petritsch Has Removed 59 Functionaries," Bosnia Daily, 9 May 2001, p. 4. For a response by Jelavić, see Mile Maslac, "We Continue with the Croat Self-Governance Until the Final Solution is Reached," Bosnia Daily, 5 April 2001, pp. 10–11.


A similar experiment is being conducted in Kosovo under the leadership of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). There are, however, important differences between Kosovo and Bosnia. One difference is that Kosovo is a part of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, whereas Bosnia and Herzegovina is an independent country. A troublesome difference is reflected in how the UN and NATO are working towards building a democratic and multi-ethnic Kosovo and Bosnia. For instance, whereas the UN and NATO are working to keep east Mostar, Bosnia united, French KFOR has decided to improve security by building a wall along the Albanian side of the River Ibar in the Kosovo city of Mitrovica, effectively dividing the Serb north from the Albanian south. Although the French commander in Kosovo believes that the wall is not meant to be a permanent structure, the possibility of security being dependent on the wall might have unintended consequences.


The May 2001 demonstrations and riots in Trebinje and Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina depict the severity of the problem that ethnic nationalism possess to a unified and peaceful Bosnia. The unrest was precipitated by the laying of cornerstones of the Osman-Pasha mosque in Trebinje and Banja Luka’s Ferhadija mosque.


Speaking at “The Conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina in Europe: Link Diversity,” held in Sarajevo on 22 March, 2001, the Croatian philosopher Ivana Flego offered the proposition that national exclusiveness is “pathological.”


10 Denitch, *Ethnic Nationalism*, p. 191. It is because of this, Denitch says, that it is a logical extension for some Croats to torment peaceful Serbian citizens of Croatia for what other, more rebellious, Serb nationals have done to other Croats (Ibid.). For an interesting discussion of whether any individual of Serbian nationality may be in some sense held responsible for the crimes committed in the name of the Serbian nation, see Nenad Dimitrijević, “The Past, Responsibility and the Future,” in Dejan Ilić and Veran Matić (eds.) *Truths, Responsibilities, Reconciliations: The Example of Serbia*, SAMIZDAT/Free B92, Belgrade, 1999, pp. 49–81.

11 The three main political parties in Bosnia are the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), the Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA), and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ).

12 The state of Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of two entities, the Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska.

13 However, the process of economic development is more than just a simple matter of increasing wealth as measured in per capita GNP, but is a matter of expanding the freedoms that people enjoy in their everyday lives. For a comprehensive treatment of this approach to development, see Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1999.

14 The importance of civil society cannot be overstated. In his *A Public Peace Process: Sustained Dialogue to Transform Racial and Ethnic Conflicts*, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1999, Harold H. Saunders writes the following: “Ending such conflicts [i.e., deep-rooted human conflicts] requires looking not only to the machinery of government, but also to the civil society, in which citizens work to build the kind of society that will provide what they need” (p. 22).


16 Ibid., p. 36. Saunders quite rightly notes that how a group remembers and communicates those experiences to future generations may be more important than “objective” factors that are instrumental in shaping present relationships. See also Vamik D. Volkan, *The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: From Clinical Practice to International Relationships*, Jason Aronson, Northvale, N.J., 1988. At “The Conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina in Europe,” the French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy assumed the extensive diversity between persons when he talked about identity as being composed of such things as circumstances, feelings, attitudes, opportunities, experiences, and relationships. His main point was the necessity of talking about identity in terms of plurality. Yet Nancy made it clear that the only
space in which Jean-Luc Nancy had just one identity was his passport number. His uniqueness was exemplified in a series of numbers reserved only for him by the government of France.

17 Saunders, A Public Peace Process, p. 35.
18 Speaking at "The Conference on Bosnia and Herzegovina in Europe: Link Diversity," Flego made the claim that diversity is good and that there is a human desire, even an urge, for diversity. Life would, he claimed, be extremely boring in a world of sameness.


20 Elshtain, "Nationalism and Self-Determination," p. 52. G.M. Támas, in "Old Enemies and New: A Philosophic Postscript to Nationalism," in Studies in East European Thought, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1993, p. 120, writes that identity and nationalism understood ethnoculturally means that "others ought to be elsewhere; there is no universalistic, overriding, trans-contextual principle 'legitimising' mixture, assimilation or diversity within the same politico-symbolic 'space'."

21 Soros, Open Society, p. xxiii.

23 Denitch, Ethnic Nationalism, p. 141.

25 This discussion becomes more complicated when minority populations, such as Gypsies (Roma, Ashkalija, and Egyptians), are included.


27 Elshtain, "Nationalism and Self-Determination," p. 56.

28 Ibid., p. 52.

29 Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, Harper & Row, New York, 1971, p. 12. As one might predict, this responsibility "lays upon one the additional burdens of gaining knowledge, reflecting on motives, predicting outcomes, criticizing principles, and so forth." (p. 12). Carl Cohen gives the standard response to the philosophical anarchist's claim that taking responsibility is a virtue. Cohen believes that though taking responsibility is a necessary condition for complete


31 Ibid., pp. 53 and 78, respectively.

32 Ibid., p. 61.

33 Ibid., p. xiii.

34 The Dalai Lama, *Ethics for the New Millennium*, Riverhead Books, New York, 1999, p. 23. In Tibetan, *shen pen kyi sem* means “the thought to be of help to Others.” And when we think about them, we see that each of the qualities noted is defined by an implicit concern for others’ well-being. Moreover, the one who is compassionate, loving, patient, tolerant, forgiving, and so on to some extent recognizes the potential impact of their actions on Others and orders their conduct accordingly. Thus spiritual practice according to this description involves, on the one hand, acting out of concern for others’ well-being. On the other hand, it entails transforming ourselves so that we become more readily disposed to do so” (Ibid.).


36 The Dalai Lama, *Ethics for the New Millennium*, pp. 162–163. Like Havel, the Dalai Lama is quite concerned about the condition politics, for “unless this wider sense of compassion . . . inspires our politics, our policies are likely to harm instead of serve humanity as a whole” (Ibid., p. 180).


43 Ibid., p. 64.

44 Stuart Hampshire, *Morality and Conflict*, Harvard University Press, Cam-

45 Rorty, "Globalization, the Politics of Identity and Social Hope," in Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 237.

46 Ugrešić, "Good Night, Croatian Writers, Wherever You May Be," in The Cultural of Lies, p. 88. It must be pointed out that ethnic nationalism is just part of the context in which ethnic cleansing and genocide took place in Bosnia. See Norman Cigar, Genocide in Bosnia, University of Texas Press, Austin, Tex., 1995.

47 In Bosnia the Good, Central European University Press, Budapest, 2000, a book that was unavailable when this essay was written, Rusmir Mahmutčeheljić takes a somewhat similar approach in his discussion of the concept of Bosnia as a "unity in diversity." I should also say that my view of "unified pluralism" is compatible with Rorty’s "dedication to pluralism."

48 Rorty, "Ethics Without Principles," in Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 79.

49 In Aryśira’s Aspiration and A Meditation on Compassion, Dharamsala, 1979, The Dalai Lama notes that the sphere of humanity is not the final sphere:

We should have this [compassion] from the depths of our heart, as if it were nailed there. Such compassion is not merely conceived with a few sentient beings such as friends and relatives, but extends up to the limits of the cosmos, in all directions and towards all beings throughout space (p. 111).

Moreover, Anton Berisha, a philosopher at the University of Pristina, has noted that my talk of spheres suggests a highly anthropocentric ethic.

50 Ibid., p. 81.

51 Ibid.


56 Martha C. Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1997. In Ethics for the New Millennium, The Dalai Lama also thinks that education, though not necessarily intercultural education, is important in establishing a universal responsibility:

It is also about opening the child’s eyes to the needs and rights of others. We must show children that their actions have a universal dimension. And we must somehow find a way to build on their natural feelings of empathy so that they come to have a sense of responsibility toward others. For it is this which stirs us into action. Indeed, if we had to choose between learning and virtue, the latter is definitely more valuable. The good heart which is the fruit of virtue is by itself a great benefit to humanity. Mere knowledge is not (pp. 181–182).
Nussbaum, *Cultivating Humanity*, p. 65.


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