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Volume XIV (2003)
Book Review:
Partner to
History: The U.S. Role
in South Africa’s
Transition to Democracy
David T. Jervis, Department of
Political Science, University of Nebraska at Kearney, Kearney, NE 68849
Lyman, Princeton. Partner to
History: The U.S. Role in South Africa’s Transition to Democracy.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2002. 344 pp. $19.95
(paper).
Princeton Lyman was the American ambassador to South Africa from
1992–95, a period during which that country completed a remarkable
transformation from a racist dictatorship to a multiracial democracy.
Partner to History provides details about Lyman’s experiences during
his term as ambassador, a description and assessment of America’s
contributions to that transformation, and a discussion of the extent to
which American contributions to the South African transition may be
relevant for other cases. A career Foreign Service Officer who has spent
most of his career dealing with Africa, Lyman is well-qualified to
undertake such a study.
Policy toward South Africa had been very controversial in the decade
prior to Lyman’s posting to the country. While Americans had long
criticized South Africa’s racial policies, there was much debate about
how to use America’s limited influence to promote change there while not
also undermining the country’s strong economy and pro-west orientation.
Chester Crocker, President Reagan’s Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs, advocated quiet diplomacy with Pretoria, cooperating
with it to resolve regional issues, and then concentrating on domestic
reform. This policy of “constructive engagement” had become very
controversial by the mid-1980s, and many Americans began to call for
economic sanctions. That effort succeeded with the passage of the
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. Sanctions were only eased in
the early 1990s as South Africa began its reform process. Lyman sees
merit in both approaches, concluding that both worked in South Africa,
constructive engagement because of the support it provided to South
Africans reformers and the entree it gave to South African
decision-makers, and sanctions because they added to white South
Africans’ sense of insecurity and isolation. He advocates such an
approach toward other dictatorships, arguing that the “lesson is that
following dual… policies in the face of such a situation is not at all a
bad thing. It adds up to a valuable array of tools by which to influence
such a situation” (274). Unfortunately, it is doubtful that agreement
can be reached on such a strategy. The typical tendency in Washington
seems to be to engage a government and ignore its excesses or to isolate
it because of its excesses, not to utilize a more subtle and
sophisticated strategy of the sort advocated here. American policy
toward South Africa in the 1980s provides an illustration. While Lyman’s
“dual policy” implies a concurrent implementation of carrots and sticks,
policy toward South Africa was sequential. Constructive engagement put
little pressure on Pretoria, and then sanctions sought to isolate and
punish the regime. Yet another problem is implementing such a strategy
once it is agreed upon. Lyman describes the difficulty: implementation
“takes case-by-case decisions on where to draw the line, where to apply
the brakes on cooperation, how to develop incentives, and what to hold
back” (274).
By
the time Lyman arrived in South Africa, divisions within the United
States over South Africa policy and its differences with Pretoria had
largely ended. In this sense, his job was easier than that of his
immediate predecessors. At the same time, the South African parties had
embarked on a difficult transition process and often sought the support
of outside parties. Lyman believes the United States played an important
role in that transition. Although South Africans are the ones primarily
responsible for their country’s transition, the “role played by the
international community, especially the United States, was an extremely
active and, without exaggerating its significance, influential one”
(xiii). The United States had first considered playing the role of
mediator, but both the government and the African National Congress
disapproved, so it decided to play the role of a facilitator, i.e.,
trying to help the parties reach an agreement, but not taking part in
the negotiations themselves.
Still the United States was very active. The bulk of the text describes
the multiple and varied American efforts to facilitate the South African
transition. It worked with the negotiators, providing support and expert
assistance when requested. For instance, the embassy funded a visit by
an American law professor to assist a panel seeking to devise rules for
mass marches, provided expertise to the South African Defense Force on
topics such as civilian control of the military, civil-military
relations in a democracy, and affirmative action, and brought ANC
officials to the United States so that they could see the workings of
the American federal system. A second American policy was to try to
persuade parties outside the negotiations—especially Constand Viljoen, a
military hero with widespread support among conservative Afrikaners, and
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, leader of the Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party—to
participate in the talks, or, minimally, not to wreck the process. A
third American policy was to work with ordinary South Africans to
prepare them to assume roles in the new South Africa. The U.S. supported
programs in leadership development and conflict resolution and funded
scholarship programs for black South Africans to attend university in
either South Africa or the United States. The United States also
provided more election-related assistance than any other country. This
took the form of voter education programs, funds for the parties
participating in the election, and coordination of more than one
thousand American election observers.
Sometimes the American role was symbolic. Following the assassination of
Chris Hani, one the ANC’s most popular figures, in the Spring of 1993,
for instance, Lyman and his wife decided to go the memorial in Soweto’s
Jubiliani Stadium. Along with two others from the embassy staff, they
were the only diplomats in attendance (many others attended a memorial
service in Johannesburg) and the only white faces in the crowd. The
funeral of Oliver Tambo less than two weeks later provided another
occasion to demonstrate American support. The U.S. sent a major
delegation, including Donna Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human
Services, Maya Angelou, Jesse Jackson, and Randall Robinson. Mandela
told Shalala he was “ecstatic” at the American presence (85). To cite
one final example, President Clinton gave an interview to South African
journalists in the tension-filled week prior to the election. Richard
Steyn, editor of the Johannesburg Star and a participant in that
interview, later cited its importance: “In that frightening period when
everybody was stockpiling, the President of the U.S. came in with a very
major interview, saying look, we’re behind you” (215).
These policies made a difference. The primary players in South Africa,
Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk, both praised the American role.
Mandela argued in August 1992 that the “United States and the ANC are
moving closer together. We are seeing problems from the same
perspective.” De Klerk made a similar assertion in November 1993,
claiming that South Africa’s relationship with the United States had
“moved from a stern one to a warm one” (77). American programs had a
direct impact on many leaders in the new South Africa. Eleven of the 27
members of Mandela’s first cabinet had visited the United States as part
of the USIA Visitor Program. More than 1,000 members of newly-elected
town councils had participated in U.S.-sponsored leadership development
programs. More than 1,300 Africans had earned college degrees in the
U.S. or South Africa as a result of an American scholarship program.
Nearly seventy percent of South African NGOs believed American
assistance had made a considerable contribution to human rights and the
social and political empowerment of blacks in their country.
Lyman believes there are lessons in the South African experience for
American policy toward other conflict situations. To reach this
conclusion, he rejects the widespread notion that what happened in South
Africa was a “miracle,” because “doing so leads to seeing it as an
aberration, a special case with limited relevance to other conflicts”
(263). One of his recommendations was noted previously, i.e., adopting a
dual policy of carrots and sticks toward rogue regimes. Another
important idea is to keep the process in the hands of the parties, i.e.,
to play the role of facilitator and not of mediator. Americans often
want to take the lead and get frustrated with lack of success, but
allowing the parties to negotiate their own agreement gives them a
greater stake in its success. It is necessary to have a large and
well-trained diplomatic presence in the country in order to be in
contact with and understand the perspectives of leading political
forces. In South Africa, for instance, it was possible to understand
conservative white opinion because two officers spoke Afrikaans, ANC
opinion because an officer was essentially stationed at ANC
headquarters, and Inkatha opinion because there was a consulate in
Durban. It is also important to coordinate policy with other governments
in order to send the same message and to increase resources. Finally,
Lyman writes of the need for American ambassadors to speak out on
conditions in the country but to do so rarely, in order to husband their
influence.
These proposals are sensible, but it is doubtful that they can be
implemented in most cases. While South Africa’s transition may not have
been a miracle, it was unique in many ways. The country is one of the
largest and most important in Africa, guaranteeing that it would receive
American attention and resources. It also possessed many of the
background conditions for conflict resolution: both leading parties
realized that they could not win militarily, both had enough
understanding of the other that some degree of mutual understanding
existed, and both had leaders committed to a peaceful transition and
willing to compromise toward that goal. Moreover, the leading parties in
South Africa wanted the United States to play an active role. Most other
civil conflicts in Africa are different. None of them receive much
attention from the U.S., and few have leaders of the quality of Mandela
and de Klerk.
Even
if the South African experience and the American role there are unlikely
to be repeated, Partner to History nonetheless provides a very
interesting and informative case study. It offers the perspective of a
diplomatic insider on the South African transition, describes the
day-to-day initiatives that often constitute the essence of diplomacy,
and demonstrates the influence the United States can have on those
situations where an American role is sought and American influence
exercised.
Volume XIV
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