

“Terrorism and European/Iraq Security: Alternatives to Ethnic Cleansing”

By Paul Wallace¹

Europe has a long history of politicized ethnic identities being expressed in wars of conquest or being scapegoat and repressed. These political actions invariably result in large-scale movements of people in what most politely can be categorized as transfers of population. Sudetenland provides a classic example. The Nazi regime absorbed the German populated part of Czechoslovakia just prior to World War II. Following the war Sudeten Germans were then expelled. Genocide is the term used for the attempted holocaust during World War II of Jews and Roma (gypsies). Ethnic cleansing also took place during World War II, but the term became popularized as a consequence of the Bosnian conflict from 1992-1995 between Serbians, Croatians and Muslims. Subsequently, ethnic cleansing of Albanians by Serbs and then of Serbs by Albanians took place in Kosovo. Similar scenarios are possible in contemporary Iraq.

As the popularization of the term “ethnic cleansing,” indicates, the end of the cold-war and its bi-polar division of the world did not resolve the political problem of how to cope with politicized ethnic identities in Europe or elsewhere. To the contrary, without the disciplinary dimension of East-West rivalry ethnic identity has become enhanced. One reputable study published in 1993 has estimates for each world region of “minorities at risk.” They range from 10.2% in Asia to 42.3% in Africa south of the Sahara. Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are second highest with 35%.

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(Gurr, 1993, 11. Carment & James, 2-7.). And these estimates are prior to the ethnic conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia in 2001. In addition to Europe's historic ethnic minorities, newer additions include Muslims ranging from North Africa to Turkey and South Asia, and Africans from various countries south of Sahara

Politically, what are the options? A least-worst option for Europe advocates transfers of population so as to increase ethnic homogeneity and reduce the possibilities of ethnic cleansing involving higher levels of repression (Hayden, 727-749, 767-778). This paper will argue the contrary position. My central theme is that ethnic identities can be altered and transformed, but majority and minority identities and attitudes will remain. They may take ethnic forms or simply be transformed into new identity structures such as religious sect or cult, caste, language, clan or sub-clan. If correct, attempting to eliminate or curtail political identities does not resolve the political problem. Inclusion rather than exclusion is essential. Cooption, accommodation and various forms of power sharing are offered as means of inclusion. Data will be drawn from various parts of the world as well as Europe.

Differing Approaches to Ethnicity

A central beginning point is that ethnic identities are politically as well as culturally determined. They are not necessarily "primordial" (Geertz, 154) in the sense of permanency. Ethnic identities, Paul Brass convincingly argues, are "social and political constructions" (Brass, 8). Politically, they are identity markers that can be mobilized for particular purposes. They are not inherited through genes, nor unalterable during a person's life cycle.

Gurr and Harff (Gurr and Harff, Chapter 2) provide useful and meaningful distinctions of differing kinds of ethnic identities. They provide four categories:

- (1) ethnonationalists,
- (2) Indigenous peoples,
- (3) communal contenders, and
- (4) ethnoclasses.

The first two seek separation or greater autonomy. The other two strive for greater access. Examples are as follows.

1. Ethnonationalists: Kurds. Includes “micro-nationalism” (Muslim Abkhazians in Georgia, Ossetians in northern Georgia.)
2. Indigenous peoples. Miskitos in Nicaragua. Descendants of original or earlier inhabitants. Many are tribal peoples throughout the world. Less advanced, more subject to discrimination. In some ways, the Roma belong in this category even though they are not indigenous except in India where they also are subject to negative stereotypes.
3. Communal contenders: Lebanon, Malaysia, Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka.
4. Ethnoclasses. Ethnic groups who resemble classes. Africans in Britain & North America, Turks in Germany, Koreans in Japan, overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia.

A fifth category, which somewhat overlaps with some of the above is “politically active religious minorities” (Gurr & Harff, 25). Conflict can ensue from a cognitive perception of being a persecuted religious minority and/or ethnic group as in northeast India, Northern Ireland, and between minority Hindus (Tamils) and majority Buddhists (Sinhalese) in Sri Lanka. Or between majority Sikhs and minority Hindus in Punjab,

India. These later two cases raise the question of what constitutes a majority. Sikhs are a 60% majority in Punjab State but only 2% of India's population (Wallace, 1988). Thus both Sikhs and Hindus in Punjab State, India have some majority and some minority characteristics that can be mobilized for political purposes.

Sri Lanka's case involves an approximately 17% minority Tamil population which is primarily Hindu contrasted with a 70% Buddhist population which is primarily Sinhalese. Yet, as in the Punjab situation, both sides can consider themselves as minorities as well as majorities. Tamil Hindus are a clear minority community in Sri Lanka, but "Sinhalese-Buddhists often tend to emphasize their minority status *vis-à-vis* the Tamils" as the huge Tamil population in the Indian state of Tamilnadu, over 40 million, just across the narrow Palk Straits dwarfs the approximately 15 million Sinhalese population in Sri Lanka (DeSilva, 1998, 8. Norton, 78-79). To state this in another way, majority Sikhs in Punjab and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka can feel like a small minority as a consequence of the overwhelming numbers of Hindus and Tamils in India.

Another scholar who attempts to explain ethnic protest in the Middle East uses different foci. He uses the familiar categories of primordial (Geertz, 1954), relative deprivation (Gurr, 1993, 123-124), and resource mobilization. He concludes that no consensus exists among Middle Eastern scholars as to which of these models "has better explanatory power of ethnic conflict" (Sahliyah, 4). The extensive nature of ethnicity in the region is provided in a chart with 25 countries in which religious and ethnic groups are distinguished and percentages furnished (Sahliyah, 9).

Another perspective is provided by psychological studies. One example is comparable to the ethno-class noted above. For example, a Pakistani immigrant

seeking to rent a room in London may be told falsely that the vacancy is filled. In this case, the landlord may classify him as a person of color, a South Asian, or a Pakistani. He may not be acting as a member of a group, but he may be so designated by others (Brown, 533). Even more revealing are the artificially produced groups, which are analogous to ethnic groups in their inter-group behavior. Muzafer Sherif's Robbers Cave experiments divide eleven-year-old boys into groups at a summer camp in Robbers Cave, Oklahoma. Real ethnocentrism, real stereotypes, and real perceived injustice were all experimentally created (Brown, 535). A variety of other experiments followed on random determined group membership. Minimalist experiments involved individuals who were not in contact with any other person yet showed in-group vs. out-group characteristics in their decision-making (Brown, 552).

A summary of ethnicity-based case studies, and of artificially induced group studies underlines the complexity and pervasiveness of group behavior. Particular characteristics are present, emerge or are stimulated. A key point is that the stimulation in regard to ethnic identity is induced. It can be by early socialization in the family or by social and political mobilization at any stage of life. By the same token, ethnic conflict, which is produced by political means, can also be confronted in efforts to reduce or eliminate it.

Changing Ethnic Groups in Europe

The two-fold problem is that identities change and "minorities" always are present. England provides a classic example with the English identity merging many earlier identities including Jute, Danish, Anglo-Saxon, and Norman. These multiple identities coalesce by the time of Gilbert and Sullivan in the 19th century that in music

and drama portray a monolithic concept of an “Englishman.” But, that “Englishman” excludes the Scottish, Welsh and Irish as well as regional and class differences.

Professor Henry Higgins in George Bernard Shaw’s play, *Pygmalion* (the film: “My Fair Lady”) is more accurate. Professor Higgins, however, misinterpreted the Spanish and Italians whose identities continue to be even more complex and changeable than the English.

Modernization as well as Marxist literature assumed that cultural differences would be lessened and become politically insignificant as the powerful engines of modernization and/or class-consciousness molded ever-larger political collectivities. The reverse may be the case. As the 20th century came to an end, the popular cliché was that the global village is succumbing to tribalism. The record in fact is mixed. Nonetheless, we have learned that magic bullets don’t exist. The forces of history, however broadly defined, have to be replaced by less simplistic tools of analysis, and by public policies that recognize political realities.

Therefore, my strongest disagreements with European emphasis on greater ethnic homogeneity are that it tends to provide less protection for minority rights. Since minorities will continue to exist in Europe there is no other option, as every state will always include minorities. Rome’s physical elimination of Carthage in the Punic wars didn’t eliminate the other “nations” within the Roman Empire. Should European governments apply this holocaust solution to today’s single largest trans-national minority, the *Roma* (gypsies)? Conversely, shouldn’t the increasingly politicized Roma nation demand a state if their minority rights can’t be guaranteed?

A pessimistic exposition of the situation of ethnic minorities in Europe is but one part of the glass. The half-empty or dark side is partly balanced by the half-full, brighter side. Europe 's ethnic, religious and ideological complexities haven't prevented the development of the European Union. A key part of that ongoing integration includes democratic institutions and minority rights. They are inextricably related. The process has been and continues to be complicated and slow. There also is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). An institutional structure is developing with corresponding elements of a democratic civic culture. EU monitoring of Russians in Soviet successor states and of Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia play a positive role in conflict prevention.

Europe's minority complications are relatively minor in comparison with third world experiences

The Partition of India, 1947 & Ethnic Minorities

A clear method of achieving greater ethnic homogeneity is drawing new boundaries, partitioning an existing state, and transferring minority populations to the new state where they will be part of an ethnic majority. Or so it would seem. India's independence in 1947 resulted in its bifurcation into the Islamic state of Pakistan and a Hindu majority India. Antagonistic nationalist movements refused to compromise sufficiently as many plans were considered to keep India together.

A two-nation theory formulated by the Muslim League passionately and, at times violently, asserted that Muslims and Hindus constituted two nations in undivided India. Aspirations for an independent nation for the Muslims of South Asia sparked Muslim League nationalism as represented by its leader Muhammad Ali Jinnah. A contrary

secular position by the Congress Party led by Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru maintained that religious and ethnic differences comprised a unity in diversity. They unsuccessfully sought a secular state, accommodation and power sharing rather than partition. These principles, however, continue to guide the truncated India.

Contemporary Jewish and Arab nationalists conform more to the Muslim League than Congress movement nationalism in their attempts to divide Palestine.

Nonetheless, despite periodic high levels of political violence in the form of Intifadas, suicide bombers, Israeli assassinations and bombings, negotiations focus on further dividing the territory as a means to arrive at a settlement. There is even the building of a wall by Israel to separate Israel and the Palestine authority. A somewhat comparable situation exists in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia in the former Yugoslavia which are all involved in implementing or considering various forms of partition, notwithstanding NATO official commitment to multi-nationalism. It may be an axiom that partitions inevitably involve transfers of population.

What are the facts in the Indian case? Did partition prove to be successful in resolving religious and ethnic differences between Muslims and Hindus? Pakistan emerged out of partition in 1947 as an Islamic state representing, as it viewed itself, the Muslims of South Asia. Thereby both India and Pakistan were born by the movement of 15 million people representing perhaps the largest single forced migration of people in a short period of time in the history of the world.

A noted scholar on Yugoslavia, who also has conducted research in India, sets forth the partition of Punjab in undivided India as an example for European policy makers. He recognizes the human costs in which one half to a million people were

killed and approximately fifteen million were involved in the “transfer.” He cites the “murder, rape, assault, and robbery” as “literally millions of people left their homes.” Yet, he continues, “for all the violence of the ‘transfer of populations,’ it was soon over” and the vast majority of refugees became part of their new countries “quickly and relatively completely.” (Hayden, 739). In this context, as he recognizes, the Sikhs constituted a third religious, ethnic community. A minority to both the Muslims and Hindus in undivided Punjab, they were forced to leave the Pakistan part of Punjab for the part which remained in India. Thus, three major groups are to be considered: Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs.

Leaving aside the relatively short-term human costs for the purpose of focusing on the construction of homogenous ethnic communities, one can assess the level of success achieved by India’s partition in 1947. A homeland for India’s Muslims constituted the only significant goal for the Muslim League. Majority Muslim areas in western and eastern India became the new Pakistan, separated by almost a thousand miles of India. Religion constituted the marker that united the two parts of Pakistan, but it proved to be inadequate. East Pakistanis by 1969 reverted to another identity that distinguished them from their Islamic cohorts in the west. Bengali language and culture became politicized in opposition to perceived West Pakistan and particularly Punjabi exploitation and repression. Bangladesh emerged as an independent state, replacing the province of East Pakistan, following a bloody civil war in 1971.

Pakistan, consisting of only what was the western wing, became a virtually all-Muslim state seemingly much more homogenous than with the troublesome Bengalis and the enormous distance between the two territorial wings. Religious homogeneity

seemingly increased, as it didn't have a significant Hindu population in what had been East Pakistan. Moreover, the military, bureaucracy and major economic forces were centered in the new Pakistan. Nonetheless, despite this picture of enhanced ethnic and religious homogeneity, it is barely accurate even at the macro level.

Operationally, Pakistan continues to be beset by identity problems involving disputes between Sunni and Shiite Muslims. One Muslim sect, the Ahmadiyas, constitutionally became non-Muslim in 1971 as orthodox Muslims violently objected to their recognition of a living prophet. The periodic warfare between Muslims from different ethnic groups is even more violent. Especially threatening is the violence between *Mujahirs*, refugees from India in 1947 who dominate the metropolis of Karachi, approximately 14 million people in 2006, and the Sindhis and Afghans. Violence also is at a high level between the predominantly tribal Baluchis in the western province of Baluchistan and the central government, erupting into a civil war 2006.

Two partitions did not resolve Pakistan's identity problems. The military coup in 1999 that brought Pervez Musharraf to power reflects the inability of Pakistan to cope successfully with its ethnic as well as other problems. A prognosis for the future could involve radical Islamic groups, *jihadis* or *Mujahadeen* in the parlance of South Asia, now active in the Kashmir conflict with India. A spillover into domestic Pakistan politics already is occurring. Pakistan's involvement with the birth and development of the Taliban movement seemingly became reversed as a consequence of 9/11 (2001). In 2006, "Talibanization" with its extreme social and religious policies is a major factor in Pakistan at the provincial and central government levels.

Consequently, creating a homeland for India's Muslims in Pakistan hasn't been achieved even in a demographic sense. East Pakistan, which became Bangladesh in 1971, is the third largest Muslim nation in the world following Indonesia. India has at least 140 million Muslims in 2006, which ranks it as number two with Pakistan containing the fourth largest Muslim population in the world.

A third community involved in India's 1947 partition also has to be considered in this assessment. Sikhs were spread between what became the two Punjabs, one in Pakistan and one in India. Partition concentrated them into India's Punjab. Nonetheless, the transfer of the Sikh population into India's Punjab did not solve the minority problem there either. Continuing political agitations led to a redrawing of boundaries again in 1966; this time within India. For the first time, a Sikh majority state emerged but again with a large minority population. Table 1 provides the basic facts in terms of transfers of population and changes of boundaries.

Religious Composition of the Three Punjabs

<u>Pre-Independence United Punjab</u> 1931	<u>India: Before A Sikh Majority State</u> 1961	<u>After a Sikh Majority State</u> 1971	1981	1991
Muslims 52.4%	1.94% (393,314)	.84% (114,447)	1.0% (168,094)	1.18% (239,401)
Hindus 30.2%	63.57% (12.9 m)	37.54% (5.58 m)	36.9% (6.2 m)	34.5 % (7.0 m)
Sikhs 14.3%	33.33% (6.8 m)	60.22% (8.16 m)	60.75% (10.19 m)	62.95% (12.8 m)

TOTAL POPULATION

24,969,408	20,300,812	13,551,060	16,788,915	20,281,969
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Sources: Compiled by Paul Wallace from:

Government of India Census Reports for 1931, 1961, 1971.

Government of Punjab, Statistical Abstract of Punjab, 1983, p. 38.

Government of India, Census of India 1981, Paper 4 of 1984, pp. 494-517.

Government of India, Census of India 1991, Paper 1 of 1995, pp. xvi-xvii.

Sikhs, only 2% of India's total population, agitated for further partitioning of Punjab following independence in 1947 so as to create a state in which they would be a majority. That successful agitation used non-violent tactics. Fifteen years after achieving a Sikh majority state in 1966, political violence and terrorism became part of the Punjab scene in India in the form of a Sikh separatist movement despite the achievement of an ethnically majority Sikh state. At least 40,000 people were killed in the period from 1981-1992. Thus, virtually eliminating Muslims from India's Punjab and the further internal partitioning didn't resolve the Sikh "minority problem." It just changed the contours. (Wallace, 2006)

Kashmir, bordering Punjab to the north, is India's most troubled state in India in 2006. It also shares its border with Pakistan. But unlike Punjab, which "transferred" almost all of its Muslim population east and west, Kashmir is India's only state that has a Muslim majority. Thus, from India's perspective it is the symbol of secular India. Pakistan, however, argues that Kashmir should be part of Islamic Pakistan on the basis of its two-nation nationalist theory.

Theoretically, peaceful transfers of population and territory, or ethnic cleansing could clarify the Kashmir situation. Jammu, southern Kashmir, is predominantly Hindu. Eastern Kashmir, the Ladakh area, is a majority Buddhist region. The vale of Kashmir, in India, and the area under Pakistan control in western and central Kashmir are

predominantly Muslim. However, Kashmir is even more complicated than these simple generalizations. Like Pakistan and India's Punjab, transfers of population--arranged or forced--won't solve Kashmir's problems. They will only reconfigure ethnic groupings without resolving the problems. (Wallace, 2006)

Somalia's Somewhat Unique Sub-Clan Case

Collapse of the Soviet oriented states in 1989 and of the Soviet Union itself two years later had its repercussions in the horn of Africa. Somalia had alternated between being a Soviet and a U.S. client state. In the 1990s, it literally disintegrated as a state. Seemingly, ethnic differences weren't a factor as a common language, religion, culture, territory and other attributes dominated without significant ethnic minorities. Clan rivalries became the dominant mode of political organization in a context of almost anarchic violence. Clans, therefore, became the functional equivalent of politicized ethnic groups. A dominant clan in one part of Somalia constituted a minority in other parts.

In this context, I served as an expert witness in an appeal by a Somalian in 1999. He sought political asylum in the United States following the killing of his father in his home town of Mogadishu by members of the Hawiye clan, subsequent threats to his and his family's lives in Somalia and in a refugee camp in Kenya. My expertise stemmed from serving as an expert witness in many cases involving Sikhs from India, academic experience about Africa south of the Sahara, including the guidance of PhD. Dissertations, and knowledge of ethnic politics.

An original judgment by the court in 1997 held that asylum should not be granted as the individual could safely return to a part of Somalia in which his admittedly powerful

Darod clan had a controlling majority. Examining the documentary evidence, including reports from the U.S. government, United Nations, and Amnesty International, various affidavits and newspaper accounts about the provincial area in question, it was not difficult to establish that clan politics in Somalia has been replaced by sub-clan politics in this case. For example, a Reuter's dispatch from Mogadishu (January 6, 1999) reported on "fighting between Majertein militia loyal to Mohamed Said Hirsi....and the rival Mahehan sub-clan..." These are sub-units of the Darod clan. The applicant for political asylum belongs to the Mahehan sub-clan. Sub-clan violence extended to the Dallas airport where the applicant worked. A member of his sub-clan was gunned down in front of him in July 1998 (*The Fort Worth-Star Telegram*, July 28, 1998). Provided with the evidence, the appellate court agreed that the applicant belonged to an endangered minority sub-clan.

Conclusion

It is easy to prescribe the necessity of building democratic values and institutions. In East Central Europe, the states most praised in this regard are the largely homogeneous ethnic nation states--Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Even in these three states politically relevant heterogeneity exists.

South Asia is much more complex. Nonetheless, fair elections are replacing military coups and military rule with the exception of the replacement of civilian by military rule in Pakistan in 1999. Arrogant leaders and corruption, whether in Pakistan, India or Bangladesh, increasingly lead to loss of power and judicial action. However, ethnic problems, which lead to consideration of transfers of population, continue to

plague the countries of South Asia in 2006, including renewed ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. Increasing tribal political competition in northeast India is described in detail by Sandhya Goswami and Manoj Kumar for Assam and by Rajesh Dev for Meghalaya. (Roy & Wallace, Chapters 9 & 10.) It remains to be seen as to whether tribal political competition will replace or lead to an increase in the pattern of violence that has afflicted northeast India. One conclusion stemming from this paper is that simply providing increased autonomy or transferring populations with the expectation of achieving ethnic purity is not the answer to these **political** problems.

Iraq presents a comparable set of problems. Political identifications based on religion, sect, ethnicity, region, and even degree of secularity and oil resources render various plans for autonomy or division of Iraq problematical. Transfers of population will not provide homogeneity for Shias, Sunnis, Kurds, and Turkomen. Regional considerations are present involving Turkey for the Kurds, Iran for Kurds and Shias, and Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Gulf states in regard to Sunnis and other considerations. Any political solution for Iraq is further complicated by the concentration of oil resources in the Shia south and the northern area around Kirkuk dominated by Kurds but contested by Sunnis and Turkomen. All of these factors become politicized and enter into the identities of the contesting parties.

What then are appropriate public policies in individual states, and by international bodies? Are peaceful transfers of population preferable to ethnic cleansing, or is that even a proper question? In retrospect, what option was preferable in the Sudetenland to the one exercised? Could partition and its human tragedies have been avoided in Punjab in 1947? What role can or should national and international authorities exercise

in situations of political violence such as in Punjab in the 1980s, Karachi, Baluchistan and Kashmir in the 21st century, Sri Lanka since 1983, and in the former Yugoslavia from 1991 including the contemporary situations in Macedonia and Kosovo? What policies should be pursued for the increasingly fragmented politics of northeast India? What options, if any, are politically viable for Iraq?

These are fundamental questions raised by the advocates of public policies involving transfers of population and/or the redrawing of political boundaries. Many of these suppositions are questionable and have been strongly questioned in this paper, which maintains the inevitability of ethnic and other kinds of minorities. Advocates of transfers of population are not responsible for poor political leadership in cases resulting in human tragedies. To the contrary, they are to be commended not only for raising important questions, but also for placing them in a comparative context. Hopefully, this is the beginning of a cross system, cross-culture discourse on alternatives to transfers of population.

Arend Lijphart provides a basic framework for comparative discourse in the power sharing approach, which he advocates in various studies on consociationalism. His consociational approach as applied to India (Lijphart, 1996) emphasizes four areas of accommodation for a deeply divided society:

1. A grand coalition government that includes representatives of all major linguistic and religious groups,
2. cultural autonomy for these groups,
3. proportionality in political representation and civil service appointments, and
4. a minority veto with regard to vital minority rights and autonomy.

In a subsequent comparative version and application of consociationalism to 36 democracies, Lijphart provides an executive-parties dimension and a federal-unitary dimension, each with five characteristics (Lijphart, 1999, 3-4). Other sections of the book focus on particular concerns such as Chapter 5 on “Party Systems.”

Obviously, neither Lijphart nor any other scholar or politician offers what could be termed a solution. In addition to the negotiated brokering inherent in Lijphart’s approach, a wider institutional framework is developing. International courts are one response to the excesses of political violence. War crimes tribunals are functioning at The Hague in the Netherlands particularly for Bosnia, and in Tanzania for Rwanda. A European Court for Human Rights also is functioning in an effective manner. In May 2001, it ruled that Britain violated the human rights of ten members of the Irish Republican Army and two civilians shot to death by security forces in Northern Ireland in the 1980’s and 1980’s. The 7-0 ruling in Strasbourg held that the government violated the right to life as guaranteed by Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (*New York Times*, May 4, 2001).

Another variant is the Documentation Centre of Cambodia, which focuses on the genocidal policy of the Pol Pot regime from 1975-1979. It details the “killings fields” which took two million lives in this small country (*Bangkok Post*, March 2, 2000). Similarly, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the Union of South Africa is an institutional response to past injustice and a meaningful effort not only for transparency, but also for closure.

Systematic efforts on behalf of minority and human rights were noted earlier in regard to the European Union. Associated and aspirant states as well as EU members

are subject to these pressures on behalf of a civil society. The gamut thus runs from prevention and managing ethnic conflicts (see Carment and James) to international responses and closure-type measures following the violence. Tactics, strategies and institutional measures all have to be considered in relation to the particular situation or pattern of problems. All of these considerations require dialogue, negotiations and compromise, even or especially if it requires dealing with the devil (Wallace & McDonnell).

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Prof. Emeritus Paul Wallace
Department of Political Science
113 Professional Bldg.
University of Missouri
Columbia, MO 65211
e-mail; wallacep@missouri.edu
fax: 573/884-5131
Phone: 573/442-0681